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Prof. Dr. Peter Egger

ETH Zürich, Switzerland

Authors: Peter Egger,  Mario Larch,  Kevin E. Staub

Abstract: 

The large reduction in tariff rates worldwide under several rounds of the GATT is commonly credited with being one of the most notable economic policy accomplishments since World War II. However, the remarkable progress towards free trade of goods is unparalleled in trade with services where liberalization agreements are much harder to achieve and cross-border transactions are impeded by far tighter barriers than for the exchange of goods. In any case, the question as to how trade policy affects services trade is complex for various reasons. First, services transactions are much harder to measure than goods transactions and acceptable data on service trade have only recently become available, mostly for trade of OECD countries. Second, neither production nor trade of goods and services are independent; often they are even unseparable. Thus, achievements towards liberalizing cross-border trade of goods should have an impact on services and, by the same token, the lack of liberalization of services trade should be responsible for there being less goods trade than possible. We provide a general equilibrium comparative static estimate of the trade and welfare effects of trade policy measures towards goods and services trade.

Full Text: “Trade Preferences and Bilateral Trade in Goods and Services: A Structural Approach”

Prof. Cary A. Deck

University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, USA

Authors: Cary Deck, Shengle Lin, and David Porter

Abstract: 

Documented results indicate prediction markets effectively aggregate information and form accurate predictions. This has led to a proliferation of markets predicting everything from the results of elections to a company’s sales to movie box office receipts.  Recent research suggests prediction markets are robust to manipulation attacks and resulting market outcomes improve forecast accuracy.  However, we present evidence from the lab indicating that single-minded, well-funded manipulators can in fact destroy a prediction market’s ability to aggregate informative prices and mislead those who are making forecasts based upon market predictions. However, we find that manipulators primarily influence market trades meaning outstanding bids and asks remain informative.

Full Text: “Affecting Policy by Manipulating Prediction Markets:  Experimental Evidence”