Události

St 14.02.2024

Laura Montenbruck (University of Mannheim) "Fiscal Exchange and Tax Compliance: Strengthening the Social Contract Under Low State Capacity"

Laura Montenbruck, M.A.

University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: This article provides evidence that increased salience of public service provision can strengthen the social contract and increase tax compliance in a low-capacity setting. I conduct a field experiment randomizing information about public service provision across 5,494 property owners and tenants in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Receiving information increases property tax payments by 20% on average. The effect is driven by increases in tax compliance on both the extensive and intensive margin. Residents of low-value properties are 7–16 percentage points more likely to pay taxes when informed about public services that are both geographically accessible and respond to the citizens’ most urgent needs, suggesting a benefit-based approach to taxation. Revenue effects are largely driven by residents of high-value properties, who depend less on the public provision of services, and for whom the treatment seems to act as a more general signal of government performance.

JEL Classification: H20, O23, D73
Keywords: Social contract, Property tax, Public services, Tax compliance

Full Text: Fiscal Exchange and Tax Compliance: Strengthening the Social Contract Under Low State Capacity